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Abstract- In this paper the philosophical concept of
authenticity is used as a framing device for providing an
interpretation of aspects of both ethical and practical action on
the part of information systems (IS) professionals. It is argued
that ethical codes and IS methods may be of limited value in IS
work. Both ethical codes and IS methods are complicated by the
need to adopt positions on, and give recommendations about, IS
practice. One key problem here is that IS analysts and designers
have to intervene in organisations (and thereby intervene in the
lives of the members of those organisations). It is argued that an
important issue for IS research is whether they to do so in (what
will be characterised as) an authentic manner, or in sincere
adherence with either a code of professional ethics or with a
series of methodological precepts.

I. INTRODUCTION
Participants in information systems development can
expect to have their professional judgement tested in a
variety of ways, many of which are catalogued in Codes of
Practice issued, for example by the ACM and BCS. Such
codes are concerned with guiding action and are normative in
character, generally described by deontological or
consequentialist theories of ethics. In strict deontological
ethics certain standards of conduct should never be broken;
in consequentialism the ethics of any action can be evaluated
according to particular criteria, usually well-being, happiness
or the greater general good. Ethical codes, however, are
notoriously difficult to apply and enforce. Because such
codes necessarily theorise ethical issues in gross and abstract
terms, identifying and resolving ethical dilemmas is
ultimately dependent on the probity of those involved. The
type of professional know-how required for identifying
problems and concerns not previously envisaged differs
markedly from that required for the mastery of skills for the
prosecution of pre-specified goals and objectives. Walsham
identifies this with the idea of a virtuous practitioner [1].
Although it is common to treat ethics as a system of rules
forbidding us to do things, the topic may be treated as the
basis for thinking about how we are to live [2]. Because of
the impossibility of pre-specifying ethical issues and relating
them faithfully to actual contexts (for example, when is
“whistle-blowing” justified?), the limitations of ethical codes

may be succeeded by a concern for personal authenticity.
Authenticity is usually defined as that which is achieved
when people take hold of the direction of their own lives
without the direction being determined for them by external
factors [3]. The virtuous practitioner has responsibilities of
interpretation and application, choices that may not be very
comfortable, but which may be evaded by appealing to some
external authority. Such elision of authenticity may be
countered with appeals for reflective evaluation, but many
accounts of the ‘reflective practitioner’ remain highly
instrumental in their prime focus on mundane ‘knowing how’
or craft aspects of the profession.
The philosophical concept of authenticity represents a
focal point for this paper’s authors who are pursuing distinct
– but related research themes: philosophical critique and
clarification of IS, and dialogical aspects of IS. The concept
of authenticity presented here is informed mainly from the
work of Nietzsche and Bakhtin [4,5]. It is hoped that
problematizing the issue of authentic intervention represents
a contribution not just to current IS ethics debates, but also to
contemporary concerns on the relationships between theory,
practice and teaching, and the role and authority of
methodologies.
In this paper authenticity is used as a framing device for
providing an interpretation of aspects of both ethical and
practical action on the part of information systems
professionals. One key problem here is that IS analysts and
designers have to intervene in organisations (and thereby
intervene in the lives of the members of those organisations).
It is argued that an important issue for IS research is whether
they do so in (what will be characterised as) an authentic
manner, or in sincere adherence with either a code of
professional ethics or with a series of methodological
precepts. We shall begin by canvassing the idea of
authenticity, before assessing methodological and theoretical
precepts, as well as reflective practice.
II. AUTHENTICITY
Ironically, although many philosophers held that
authenticity could provide a viable ethical norm, the idea
exists in tension or even contradiction to the imposition of
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codes of practice, “The concept of authenticity is a protest
against the blind, mechanical acceptance of an externally
imposed code of values.” [6]. Because of the very nature of
the concept, authenticity denies any rigid a priori essence and
resists the compliance of given standards. Indeed, the key to
authenticity is in the understanding that any such compliance
would be to abandon one’s own responsibility for freely
forming one’s selfhood and values. Authentic agents are
obliged to create values and patterns of behaviour from their
own mental resources; to invent their own way and pattern of
life. Trilling takes authenticity to be an ontological claim
about humanity; for a human being to be authentic means to
be treated by others like a human being and not like a
machine or a sub-human [7]. Importantly, it means to be
attributed epistemic responsibility, and to be deprived of
authenticity means not to be able to function as a human
being with respect to things that matter. For example, if a
culture values privacy or free expression, to be deprived of
these things would mean living an inauthentic existence.
Ontologically, authenticity expresses a complementary
self/other relationship which presupposes recognition of the
self by others and vice versa. The ethical consequence is that
in order to acknowledge our own authenticity, then we must
respect the uniqueness and authenticity of others, and
therefore acknowledge that the self/other relationship will be
one of difference; a relation which must be respected and
sustained in ethical practice. The possibility of ethics
therefore, also depends upon a community, the members of
which are sufficiently authentic themselves to distinguish the
authenticity of others. If an ethical norm is appropriate here it
would be Kant’s aphorism that morality is primarily
concerned with treating others as ends in themselves rather
than as means to ends.
Given that there is a lack of absolute guidance as to how
one is to act in any given situation, the question of “what
should one do...?” raises severe difficulties. Some sorts of
authenticity questions may be familiar to the readers of this
paper. The authors have experienced several authenticity
problems; a few are given as example questions here:
1. Should I use a methodology which has embedded values
that I do not agree with?
2. Should I use a methodology, which, in my judgement, is
wholly inappropriate to the circumstances pertaining in the
organisation?
3. Should I attempt to improve organisational performance
by introducing greater accountability in a low-wage
organisation?
These are difficult ethical questions, and whilst some of
these may be covered by the codes of conduct and practice of
professional IS bodies, others may not be [8]. Also, such
decisions require degrees of interpretation, and therefore
judgements about such matters are likely to vary from person
to person. In any case, not all IS professionals are members
of professional societies, and not all those members may be
aware of the codes of conduct and practice, and no doubt

some will choose to ignore such things. More importantly,
adherence to any such code is unlikely to be practically
enforceable; adherence will therefore have to be “granted”
voluntarily by the IS professionals concerned:
“In the scientific community the medical specialist has
better defined ethical codes than most other groups... They
are also enforced by powerful sanctions such as expulsion
from the medical profession if serious infringements occur.
Many other professionals, including the British Computer
Society, have also drawn up ethical codes but these are often
vague and difficult to apply and enforce... Ethical
responsibilities will also vary both with the nature of work
that is being carried out and the nature of the social
environment where the work is conducted.” [9].
The concept of authenticity is often primarily connected to
considerations put forward by Nietzsche (1844-1900):
“There is a term Nietzsche himself rarely employs, but
which is the most suitable label for a constant object of his
philosophical concern - ‘authenticity’... Nietzsche’s question
could now be posed as follows: ‘How to live authentically?’
... comfortable acceptance of inherited values, or comfortable
evasions of questions of value, will both do the trick. But
these are not authentic alternatives...” [10].
Nietzsche’s statements and concerns about such issues are
a constant theme in his texts [11,12]. Cooper elaborates the
concept of authenticity via some examples from teaching. He
explicates the problems thus:
“A familiar disturbance felt by the teacher arises when
some of these [educational] policies, values, or whatever, are
not ones to which he can subscribe... The disturbance
produces a problem of authenticity, for unless the teacher
resigns or is willing to invite considerable friction at work, he
must simulate agreement to views that are not his.
[Alternatively] ... The thought which may strike the teacher is
not that he cannot subscribe to, or authoritatively transmit,
various beliefs and values, but that he has slipped into, fallen
into, unreflective acceptance of them. They have become part
of the school’s furniture; they go with the job like the free
stationery.” [13].
Such questions are intensely personal, and researching how
IS professionals deal (or should deal) with such questions as
arise in IS practice will be necessary if real progress is to be
made towards the aim of improving IS practice, because
slavish adherence to externally imposed codes of conduct is
not necessarily a guarantor of ethically proper behaviour (it
has been argued).
III. AUTHENTICITY AND METHODOLOGICAL PRECEPTS
An example of a tension between methodological
adherence and authentic systems development practice can be
found within the ubiquitous concept of the systems
development life cycle. This was originally derived from an
empirical study by Barry Boehm [14]. The consequent life
cycle model has been absorbed into nearly every structured
IS method propounded ever since; if it is criticised, it is
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criticised as being a prescription that does not “work” in
practice (whatever the precise form of the criticism takes).
The usual criticism runs along the lines that the longer one
takes to “get the requirements right” the longer it takes to
develop a system at all - and the greater the likelihood
becomes that the requirements are “out of date”:
“[T]he development life cycle concept relies heavily on the
initial definition of the problem being complete and correct
and that the users’ requirements will not change in the time
taken to progress to final implementation. In the case of
modern complex information-systems neither of these
assumptions can safely be made ...” [15].
Nevertheless the widespread use of life cycle methods for
IS developments continues relentlessly (although numerous
alternative approaches are often propounded). A recent UK
survey was conducted to investigate the use of systems
development methods (amongst other things). This survey
indicated, “Within systems development, 57% [of systems
development staff] claim to be using a systems development
methodology.” [16]. The effect of the widespread adoption of
structured methods is to remove personal authenticity from
the systems development personnel. Lewis argues:
“The legacies of hard systems thinking, such as the idea of
the development life cycle, have become so deeply ingrained
in IS thinking that only rarely is note taken of the constraints
that they impose upon the way we view the development of
information-systems.” [17].
Now, as received wisdom becomes a guiding force for
decision making, so the possibilities for making any genuine
decisions tend to evaporate. As Golomb argues:
“In the context of our everyday humdrum lives, it is hard
to know what we genuinely feel and what we really are, since
most of our acts are expressions and consequences of
conditioning, imitation and convenient conformity.” [18].
Adherence to methodological prescriptions may provide
systems development staff with a convenient set of reasons
for not doing what they (truly) feel that they ought to do. The
point to stress here is that these motivations (to do what one
ought to do on authentic versus methodological grounds) are
not identical – they are very different. Indeed, Wastell has
pointed out the degree to which the adherence to
methodological prescriptions has a value as a defence
mechanism for systems development staff. Although the main
focus of Wastell’s paper is to demonstrate how it comes
about that methodology gets used as a social defence
mechanism he also argues that what is actually needed in
systems development situations is quite different:
“[M]any analysts apparently developed a fetishistic
dependence on methodology. They appeared to withdraw
from the real job of analysis, of engaging with users in an
open and frank debate about system requirements. Instead
they withdrew into the womb of security provided by the
method. They worried about details of notation, of whether
the method was being correctly implemented and of the need

to press on and fulfil deadlines rather than ensure that they
had really understood what the users wanted.” [19].
This can be interpreted as a failure of authenticity on the
part of the systems development staff encountered by
Wastell,1 and begs the question of the relation between
methodology, theory and practice. That theories should guide
practice in some way, and by implication, that theorists and
policymakers should guide practitioners are deeply
entrenched ideas, particularly - but not just - in IS. Projects in
IS typically combine complex technical challenges, often
poorly understood or ambiguous organisational practices
with the need to efficiently co-ordinate the work of all who
contribute to, or have vested interests in, the development.
By providing a set of techniques to support analysis and
design, and a model of project development which prescribes
an explicit task structure, methodology may promise
amelioration
of
these
difficulties.
Furthermore,
methodologies may facilitate learning and co-operation in the
provision of a common language and cognitive structure.
However, as we have seen, the verity of methods lies in the
transition from the normative realm of methodological theory
to the messy world of practice.
The IS profession is characterised by specialised technical
training and circumscribed theorising [20]. Therefore, it is
not surprising that most methodologies only treat technical
and rational issues [21]. This perspective may be defined as
‘technicism’, i.e. the presumption that good practice is
equivalent to efficient performance which achieves ends that
are theoretically prescribed for analysts [22]. Technicism
holds that all practice is like production or service industry,
that quality may be guaranteed through standardisation of the
development process, and that ultimately professional
practical judgements are suspect. This may delude
practitioners into thinking that they are less free to act than
they actually are, and ethical responsibility for an action may
be evaded by appeal to a theoretical imperative (such as the
laws of nature or the market).
For technicists, general theories can be set out to guide
particular practices, but the narrower technical education may
be supplemented with sociology, psychology and
organisational studies to produce students better equipped to
evaluate ethical and moral issues. The sort of criticisms
levelled at this academic model are that theoretical studies
are insufficient to guarantee effective IS professional
practice, or that their relevance to practice is not at all clear,
or indeed, that theory construction has become a barrier to
real world understanding [23]. Both theory-construction and
the direct technical application of theories to practice can be
challenged by directly applying to IS an argument made by
Carr in teacher education [24]:
1. The discovery of truths about the world or the
construction of theoretical explanations are not the principal
goals of IS enquiry, deliberation or endeavour. In this sense,
1

In the case study discussed herein, the method used was the UK’s
SSADM.
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at least, IS theorising does not (paradoxically) appear to be
primarily theoretical.
2. The precise relationship of such undeniably theoretical
forms of enquiry as psychology, sociology, cybernetics and
so on to the processes of practical deliberation about
organisations, the workplace and people is inferentially
complex, value-laden, contingent, and by no means
straightforwardly construable in terms of direct application.
3. Although IS discourse is primarily practical and
therefore concerned with the achievement of certain sorts of
goods, it differs from technical deliberation in not being
exclusively or even primarily concerned with questions of
efficiency and effectiveness in the course of such pursuit. IS
problems therefore cannot be solely construed in technical
terms.
4. Therefore IS discourse is evaluative or moral rather
than solely theoretical or technical. Evaluative arguments,
unlike theoretical arguments are defeasible, and, unlike
technical inferences, means are invariably related to ends
internally or constitutively rather than externally or causally
(as theory demands).
This is not to deny the importance of theoretical studies,
truth, technique or efficiency, but merely to affirm where the
logical centre of gravity about IS discourse and enquiry
should be located. The information and evidence supplied by
theoretical research may indeed be indispensable for
deliberations about what is to be done in the interests of good
practice; but - because there can be no direct ethical
derivation of an ought from an is - such information cannot
directly dictate the course of our practical decisions where
these have a moral or evaluative focus and implications [25].
Carr further identifies this perspective on professional
development and education with a Cartesian interpretation of
rational conduct; i.e., as a behavioural event preceded by an
episode of theorising. The error of this view has long been
exposed, and many non-Cartesian studies of human conduct
are
available
within
the
general
IS
corpus,
e.g.[26,27,28,29,30]. The unreflective or blind application of
theories or methodologies is incompatible with authentic
existence, but some may find comfort where theoretical
prescription appears to limit their freedom to choose and
offers them a way of opting out of a moral requirement to
think and justify in particular contexts.
IV. AUTHENTIC INTERVENTION
Many models of authenticity have been propounded, but in
the remainder of this paper we will only consider those
proposed firstly by Nietzsche, and secondly by Bakhtin
[31,32].
Structured / life cycle methodological precepts make little
allowance for the influence of choice on the part of the IS
professionals - who will be (methodologically) guided to
investigate practically everything relevant in a particular
study. Of course, such detailed and thorough investigations
are not only difficult to achieve practically, but run counter to

the actual social-psychological conditions in which analysts
operate. Firstly, on organisational (social) grounds:
“The modern organisational environment is a far cry from
the well-ordered world of the classical bureaucracy, with its
elaborate hierarchical division of labour and highly
routinized procedures. The modern organisation, in contrast,
is characterised by constant innovation, by flux and fluidity
[which] presents a potent challenge to the social defences
that characterise the traditional organisation, such as the
bureaucratic ritual, which contain anxiety by narrowing
attention and by defining rigid roles. The new demands
require a broadening of rules, wider boundaries, increased
integration and interdependence.” [33].
Secondly, can the concept of Nietzschean authenticity help
us to understand the psychological demands placed on
contemporary IS professionals? Nietzsche’s arguments on
such issues can be found in Book Five of The Gay Science
[34]. However, his style of writing makes no concession to
the reader and does not lend itself easily to the discourse of
IS development! Golomb makes the following points –
concerning how Nietzsche conceptualised the relationship
between authenticity and epistemology - in a contemporary
manner:
“An individual’s life comprises a boundless number of
experiences and notions, including a tremendous amount of
superfluous information. Through awareness of one’s
authentic needs one may organise and refine this chaos into a
harmonious sublimated whole. Initially the self is a bundle of
conflicting desires and an array of contradictory possibilities.
The self’s unity is a function of its own decisions and
creations. The search for authenticity is seen as the wish to
reflect one’s own indeterminacy by spontaneous choice of
one of the many possible ways of life. The individual is a
kind of artist who freely shapes his self as a work of art.”
[35].
Prima facie, a great deal of systems development work in a
turbulent organisational environment can – indeed must –
depend on the authenticity of the development staff if good
systems are to be developed. Slavish adherence to
methodological prescriptions can only serve to deny the
insights and wisdom attained by systems development staff
(about the actual needs of the organisation) over many years
of experience. Moreover, it can be conjectured that the
widespread use of contract IS/IT staff – often with disastrous
consequences – may be indicative that insufficient attention
has been paid, by IS managers, to the role that authenticity
plays in good systems development [36].
V. AUTHENTICITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
A basic difference between technical and moral reasoning
is captured by repeating Kant’s aphorism that morality is
primarily concerned with treating others as ends in
themselves rather than as means to ends. Schon associates the
former with an epistemology of practice derived from
positivist philosophy, which he terms technical rationality.
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This demands practitioners be instrumental problem solvers
who select technical means best suited to reaching
appropriate decisions. Rigorous professionals solve wellformed instrumental problems by applying theory and
technique derived from systematic, preferably scientific
knowledge. He maintains that real world problems do not
present themselves to practitioners as well-formed structures,
indeed, they rarely present themselves as problems at all, but
as messy, indeterminate situations [37].
The contrast to technical rationality appears in the idea of
reflective practice where ends and means are continually
reformulated by practitioners, and professionals’ own
authentic insights are preserved. Theory and practice are
constantly reinterpreted within particular contexts that can be
described in both moral and technical ways, and more elusive
agendas such as emancipation and democracy may be
considered. However, Monach et al. found that although
design engineers may produce extensive socio-technical
analyses, they were not usually detached from practice or
ever returned to and reflected upon post hoc [38]. But more
importantly, ethical issues or issues of authenticity that
escape reflective practice entirely are again likely to occur in
situations where one is confronted with the ethical question
of “what should one do...?”, because as Nietzsche astutely
observed, life is lived forwards, but understood backwards.
In other words, the person is participating in an event, and
with others is already the architect of its meaning, before the
‘reflective practice’ of contemplating the significance of that
event.
As IS professionals often acquire a fairly detailed
knowledge of organisational and working practices the
predicament of “what should one do?” may not be unusual.
Examples from the authors’ experience include process
controllers who release dangerous toxins to the environment
at times when they could not be detected, and insurance
actuaries who actively discriminate against certain categories
of people. Neither of these practices would be publicly
defendable but were deemed economically essential (and
therefore practices technology should not disrupt). The
practitioners’ immediate response to these dilemmas may
serve to either legitimate or condemn such practices, but in
all cases will contribute to the valorisation of these acts as
‘normal’, ‘necessary’, ‘clandestine’, ‘improper’ and so on.
The sociological concept “articulation work” is at issue
here [39]. Articulation work refers to the continuous efforts
required of people to assemble discontinuous elements into
working configurations appropriate for the activities at hand.
This intellectual, moral, social and tactile ‘spadework’ is
necessary to craft the ambiguity and openness of such things
as organisations, professional practices, materials and
technologies into integrated working systems, and repairing
these systems when they are seen to breakdown. Accordingly,
the ethical and moral dimensions of the situations described,
or what ‘ought’ to happen or ‘ought’ to be the case, are
articulated by participants in situ. Practitioners will be

‘thrown’2 into ethically ambiguous or dilemmatic situations
by and with participants on the spot. It is possible to reflect
on these situations at will, but the ethical moment, as it were,
is at the point of the articulation of the meaning and
significance of those events and actions, where the rights and
wrongs (the ‘oughts’) are resolved, or not. One fundamental
error or vulnerability of reflective practice then, as
Nietzsche’s dictum suggests, and the earlier classroom
example endorses, is that it is simply wrong placed.
Nietzsche’s observation of life being lived forwards has
been explored as the ‘world-as-event’ by Bakhtin, who
maintains that there is a disjunction or gap between
immediate experience and symbolic representations of this
experience [40]. Bakhtin’s version of authenticity is
associated with his attempt to reconcile prosaic life (bound to
our physical bodies) and cognitive or theoretical thinking
(free to move as it pleases) in a concept of the answerable
act, where ethical responsibility arises out of the actualisation
of both the repeated and the unique in specific social events.
Bakhtin finds both aesthetic and theoretical thinking
problematic precisely because they abstract what they
imagine to be ‘important’ from actual events located within
real time and space, and gain life of their own within this
abstract realm of thinking. In doing so they deny a dialogical
(answerable) relationship with the concrete other who is
displaced by an abstract category within a monologic
theoretical framework. In contrast, properly formed dialogic
contexts will exhibit a ‘surplus of vision’ between users and
designers that facilitates the effective learning processes upon
which systems development depends.
Retrospective mediation, such as reflective practice,
employing aesthetic intuition or theoretical thinking divide
the content of an act (its product) from the act itself (or its
actual historical performance); the plurality of life as event is
removed from its dialogic context and the subjective or
theoretical singular moral consciousness is imposed in favour
of the differentiated consciousness of otherness. Indeed, from
this perspective, reflective practice entrenches technicism’s
Cartesian egological reason by denying the significance of
the other in the construction of ethical judgements. This
fragments responsibility, and further violates Kant’s axiom
by encouraging a purely cognitive relation to the other.
Accordingly, the other is related to not as another subject but
as an object. Zuboff has identified exactly the same
egological imperative in the way that technology transforms
the management function from acting with people to acting
on them [41]. Not surprisingly, in some cases reflective
practice may function as if it were just another technique for
the improvement and assessment of IS, rather than for ethical
or moral evaluation.

2

This term is derived from Heidegger who held that a human being is
‘thrown’ into an already existing world and thereafter has to be
responsible for itself and involve itself in a concerned or caring way in
the world it finds.
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Bakhtin makes a special effort to reunite the aesthetic (the
shaping of meaning in action) and the ethical (a cognitive
element of the act itself) into one unified event, and suspects
Kantian transcendental a prioris such as deontological and
consequentialist ethics cannot address actual ethical problems
and dilemmas as they emerge within the everyday lifeworld:
“‘Man-in-general’ does not exist; I exist and a particular
concrete other exists. If I remain in communion with
immediate experience and the concrete other, then I can
maintain a relation of answerability to other selves and the
world at large, and can accept full responsibility for my
actions and words. Because my participation in the world is
unique and non-recurrent, shared by no other person, no one
else can accept responsibility on my behalf.” [42].
This explains Bakhtin’s forthright defence of personal
authenticity: there is no ‘alibi’ in Being. In justifying our
deeds by recourse to an abstract ideology or a sociopolitical
imperative, we are provided with just such an alibi for
evading our responsibility, in which case ‘what we have is
not an answerable deed but a technical or instrumental
action’. If we act purely out of obligation to such abstractions
or rationalised expediencies, then we ‘turn into impostors or
pretenders’, and abrogate the onus of answerability [43].
Authenticity is a predicate of acts rather than character or
self, but refers to the integrity an innermost self, free of
dogmatic beliefs, and the external manifestations of the self
[44]. Bakhtin’s ethical norms (the norms of answerability) are
articulated from inside the act, as the answerable act, not
from an external belief system or discipline that places it into
context. However, when subjected to the instrumental
rationality and the bureaucratic structures that characterise
many IS developments and applications, the viability of this
sphere of sociality is seriously threatened, and with it the
continuity of human responsibility and ethicality itself .
Ironically, for technicism and reflective practice, as in
most analyses, no particular individual ever has to exist, any
abstract person will do. Yet the authenticity of the ‘moral
agent’ has to be underwritten in the concrete ethical act, or
the person need feel no responsibility for their own lives or
acts Privileging the abstract and theoretical essentially leads
away from responsibility and ethical action, instead of
towards it. Theoretical thinking limits the degree to which
individuals act responsibly because it locates the most
important aspects of an act outside the responsible self
participating in the event itself. This may be a grave failing,
for it allows individuals to displace their unique
responsibilities through appealing to a categorical ‘good’
posited by theoretical thinking.
‘Located accountability’ may make professionals
answerable for their actions, but the ethics of answerability
remains provocative for IS because of an acquired mandate
to contain the world within immutable, unified systems of
concepts and categories [45]. The normalising of events, the
displacement of acts from actions, and the inevitable
separation of the prosaic and aesthetic involved in work

textualization, conspire against Bakhtin’s ethical, authentic
self maintaining a relation of answerability with a nonabstract other.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has reported work on the philosophical concept
of authenticity as providing both a better way of
understanding the role played by ethical codes and IS
methods, and as way of characterising actual IS practice, in
modern organisations. Clearly work needs to be done in
organisations to investigate how authenticity is actually
mobilised (or not as the case may be) in organisations.
Furthermore, the beneficial and/or detrimental affects that
authentic activities have on the systems development process
should also be investigated.
Although the two versions of authenticity have been
characterised (very basically, given space constraints), other
philosophers and authors of literature have made important
contributions to the debate – including Heidegger. Further
research would need to investigate these views also. Finally,
it should be noted that Adorno provides a powerful critique
of the whole notion of authenticity [46]. This critique is
mainly directed against the Heidegerrian version of
authenticity. Suffice it to say here that such a critique needs
to be taken seriously and warrants further research.
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